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We show evidence that female board representation is associated with greater innovative 
success, and thus enhances firm performance in innovation-intensive industries. Firms with 
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given R&D expenditures. An increase of 10 percentage points in the tenure-weighted fraction 
of female directors is associated with approximately 6% more patents and 7% more citations. 
Investigating the underlying mechanisms, the positive association between female board 
representation and corporate innovation is stronger when product market competition is lower 
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1. Introduction 
Board gender composition has gained substantial attention over the past decade in light of 
growing regulatory pressure on firms to address the underrepresentation of women in the 
boardroom. Some countries such as Norway, France, and Italy have enacted binding gender 
quotas, whereas others, including the UK and Spain, have taken a “soft” approach to 
regulation, which provides recommendations that encourage, rather than require, greater 
female board representation (Smith, 2014). Parallel to and reinforcing these governance 
reform efforts is a growing body of research examining whether corporate outcomes can be 
influenced by more women on boards and the potential governance mechanisms that achieve 
them (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Masta and Miller, 2013; 
Adams and Ragunathan, 2015). The critical insight from this literature is that gender 
differences in the boardroom matter, especially in relation to monitoring effectiveness, 
meaning that some firms may benefit from increased representation by female directors. 
In this paper, we attempt to investigate and emphasize the impact of female directors by 
focusing on corporate innovation. More precisely, we investigate the following questions. 
Does the existing evidence for the influence of women on boards extend to corporate 
innovation outcomes? Second, given the importance of innovation in driving economic 
growth, does the effect (if any) of board gender composition on innovation translate into 
improved corporate performance? If board gender diversity matters for innovation and 
performance, do firms in innovation-intensive industries benefit more from female board 
representation than others? 
Innovation is a key determinant of firm- and national-level competitiveness (see Porter, 
1992, and Solow, 1957, respectively) and innovation productivity is of interest to a large 
number of stakeholders such as firm managers, employees, and investors (Fang, Tian and 
Tice, 2014). Yet, agency problems associated with innovation are likely to be severe for at 
least two reasons. First, risk-averse managers who are concerned about job security may 
reduce risky investments in innovation in favor of investments in less risky, routine projects 
(O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012). Second, managers may prefer a quiet life (Bertrand and 
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Mullainathan, 2003) and dislike the costly efforts associated with innovation projects. 
Therefore, monitoring has to be intensified to improve the governance of innovation.1  
The extant literature suggests that female directors enhance the effectiveness of internal 
governance as a greater representation of women on the board is associated with more effort 
on monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), increased public disclosure and stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidni and Ng, 2011), greater board independence and activism 
(Adams, Gray and Nowland, 2010; Perrault, 2015), and improved board deliberations of 
complex issues (Huse and Solberg, 2006). Thus, it is plausible that female directors help 
mitigate agency problems and could encourage firm innovation by providing effective 
monitoring. On the other hand, intense monitoring by female directors could also undermine 
innovation if it promotes managerial myopia and leads managers to reduce long-term 
investments in innovation (Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011; Becker-Blease, 2011). 
Whether increased monitoring by female directors enhances or impedes corporate innovation 
therefore requires empirical investigation.2 
We first examine the relation between female board representation and various 
measures of corporate innovation. We measure the firm’s investment in innovation by the 
level of research and development (R&D) expenditures and innovation productivity by patent 
and citation counts. We find that female board representation is positively associated with 
both R&D expenditures and innovation output. Controlling for R&D expenditure, boards 
with female directors remain associated with more patents and citations. Specifically, we find 
                                                          
1 Atanassov (2013), Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) and Bernstein (2015) provide supportive evidence 
demonstrating the importance of strong corporate governance for improving innovation. Managers innovate less 
when the monitoring provided by takeover threats and investors is reduced. 
2 We acknowledge another strand of the literature that considers risk aversion. Evidence on population gender 
differences suggests that women are generally more risk averse than men (see the survey by Croson and Gneezy 
(2009)). However, Adams and Funk (2012) and Adams and Ragunathan (2015) argue that gender differences in 
the general population may differ from those in the boardroom because of self-selection (women at the top of 
the corporate ladder may be quite different from those in the general population) or adaptive behavior to the 
requirement of the job. They provide evidence that female directors are less risk-averse than male directors in 
their sample. More generally, Nelson (2015) revisits the evidence on gender differences in risk-perception and 
risk-taking through a different lens and suggests that traditional inferences, supporting higher risk aversion 
among females, are in fact far more mixed. Thus, if boards with female directors behave in a less conservative 
manner and engage in more risk-taking activities, we may expect a positive relation between female board 
representation and firm innovation. However, we do not focus on the risk aversion explanation for two reasons. 
First, risk aversion is largely unobserved, which limits our ability to test this explanation explicitly. Second, this 
explanation is hard to reconcile with the findings of our split sample analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, although 
we are careful to recognize that our analysis does not allow us to completely rule out this alternative explanation. 
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that an increase of 10 percentage points in the tenure-weighted fraction of female directors is 
associated with approximately 6% more patents and 7% more citations. The findings are 
robust to the use of alternative econometric specifications and subsamples.  
A potential concern with the interpretation of our baseline results is that the fraction of 
female directors on the board is likely to be endogenous. Unobservable factors correlated 
with both board gender composition and corporate innovation could bias the results (the 
omitted variable concern). Moreover, female directors may self-select better performing firms 
with high innovation potential (Farrell and Hersch, 2005), or innovative firms may be more 
responsive to external calls for greater female board representation (the reverse causality 
concern). We attempt to mitigate these concerns using both propensity score matching and 
instrumental variable methods. Overall, our positive results continue to hold under these tests. 
Our positive relation between female board representation and corporate innovation 
suggests the presence of effective monitoring that resolves agency problems related to 
innovation. Therefore, we explore possible mechanisms through which greater monitoring by 
female directors enhances innovation. There are two important, established theoretical 
arguments explaining the positive relation between monitoring and corporate innovation. The 
first is that managers prefer a quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Holmström, 1989) 
and dislike costly efforts associated with innovation projects (e.g., it may require deviating 
from standard routines). Greater monitoring by female directors could mitigate this agency 
problem, reducing managers’ incentives to shirk and keeping them focused on pursuing 
innovative and value-creating projects (the quiet life hypothesis).  
The second argument is based on the career concern model of Aghion, Van Reenen and 
Zingales (2013). Risky innovation activities may cost managers their jobs if innovation 
failures are attributed to poor managerial skill, leading to an aversion to innovate. However, 
through increased monitoring, which encourages managers to innovate and reveal their talent, 
boards with female directors acquire more information about managers’ abilities before, and 
independent of, revenue realizations. In turn, this may allow the board to distinguish skillful 
managers suffering unlucky negative outcomes from poor managers. This insulation for 
managers from adverse reputational consequences of innovation (the career concern 
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hypothesis) encourages them to innovate in the first place to reveal their ability, initiative and 
talent. 
To distinguish between the quiet life and career concern hypotheses, we conduct tests 
based on heterogeneity in the relation between female board representation and innovation. 
The quiet life hypothesis predicts that product market competition and female board 
representation should be substitutes (Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013). When 
competition is low, the manager is not forced to work harder and there is more need for 
greater monitoring. Similarly, greater monitoring by female directors should be particularly 
important when managers are more entrenched. In contrast, the career concern hypothesis 
makes the opposite predictions.3 Consistent with the quiet life hypothesis, we find that the 
positive relation between female board representation and innovation is stronger when 
product market competition is lower and when managers are more entrenched. 
Finally, having established the positive association (and potential mechanism) between 
female board representation and greater innovative success, we examine its relevance for firm 
performance in industries with different dependency on innovation intensity. We find that 
women on boards are valuable only for firms in innovation-intensive industries where 
innovation and creativity play a significant role. This finding is consistent with the view that 
greater innovative success of firms with female directors translates into better corporate 
outcomes in innovation-intensive industries. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the debate 
over whether and how female representation on the board matters for corporate outcomes. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Ahern and Dittmar (2012), and Masta and Miller (2013) 
document negative effects of female board representation on firm performance. Using a 
sample of listed banks, Adams and Ragunathan (2015) find that the presence of women on 
boards is positively associated with measures of bank performance. Their findings suggest 
                                                          
3  Specifically, the career concern hypothesis predicts that product market competition and female board 
representation should be complements. In highly competitive environments, corporate outcomes become more 
uncertain, which increases the reputational risk faced by the manager. Thus, protection against the reputational 
risk of negative shocks provided by monitoring becomes particularly important. Moreover, this hypothesis 
predicts that the effect of female board representation should be weaker when managers are more entrenched 
(and shareholders and the board have less power to restrain managers). See Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales 
(2013) for more details. 
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ambiguity in the evidence on the relation between female representation and performance and 
imply greater depth in the heterogeneity across industries. Our paper complements this recent 
work by confirming that female board representation is indeed valuable in certain industries, 
our contribution demonstrating this value in firms for which innovation and creativity play an 
important role. Specifically, we find that the top four industries in which female board 
representation creates value via increasing corporate innovation are pharmaceuticals, 
computer software, electronic equipment and chemicals. 
Second, our paper adds to the growing literature that links firm (or personal) 
characteristics to innovation. Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) find that firms run by 
overconfident CEOs are associated with larger investments in innovation and greater 
innovation productivity. Tian and Wang (2014) show that IPO firms backed by more failure-
tolerant venture capital investors are significantly more innovative. Aghion, Van Reenen and 
Zingales (2013) document that firms with greater institutional ownership are associated with 
more innovation. Our results show that firms with greater representation of female directors 
invest more in innovation and obtain more patents and citations for given R&D expenditures.  
Our paper is also related to that of Miller and Triana (2009) who find a positive link 
between female board representation and firm R&D expenditures. We advance this line of 
inquiry along two important dimensions. First, we extend beyond the use of R&D 
expenditures as a proxy for innovation by focusing on a firm’s patenting activities. Patenting 
captures innovation output or productivity, which encompasses how effectively a firm utilizes 
all of its innovation inputs, both observable and unobservable. R&D expenditures, in contrast, 
represent only one particular type of observable input to innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, 
and Zingales, 2013) and can be subject to several limitations. For instance, Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) and Becker-Blease (2011) argue that R&D expenditures are sensitive to 
accounting norms such as whether it should be capitalized or expensed. Second, we 
contribute by investigating the role of greater monitoring by female directors in firm 
innovation. Our findings are consistent with the view that female directors improve firm 
innovation through effective monitoring.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and 
measurement of variables. Section 3 discusses the main results and robustness issues. Section 
4 addresses identification issues. Section 5 examines the channels through which female 
directors affect innovation. Section 6 examines whether female board representation 
enhances firm performance through greater innovation productivity. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data and measures 
2.1. Data 
We use several databases to construct our sample. Director characteristics, including gender, 
tenure and other information, are obtained from Riskmetrics, CEO information is collected 
from ExecuComp, accounting data are from Compustat and stock price information is from 
CRSP. All accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
potential impact of outliers.4 Patent-related data are collected from the 2006 edition of the 
NBER patent database which is available from 1976 to 2006. The sample includes firms that 
are at the intersection of these databases. Following the innovation literature, we do not 
restrict our sample to firms with patents. Firm-year observations with missing data on female 
board representation measures or any other controls are deleted and financial firms are 
excluded. The final sample used to examine the relationship between board female 
representation and one-year-ahead number of patents and citations consists of 1,224 firms 
from 6,644 firm-year observations over the sample period 1998 to 2006.5  
 
2.2. Empirical specification 
                                                          
4 The results hold without winsorization.  
5  Throughout our empirical analysis, independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent 
variable to help mitigate the endogeneity concern. Hence, our sample of one-year-ahead patents and citations 
begins in 1998 coinciding with the availability of director gender information (Riskmetrics) in 1997. On the 
other hand, we end our sample period in 2006 since the NBER patent database is available until 2006. Our 
sample selection starts with 10,639 firm-year observations for which we have lagged board characteristics data. 
Excluding financial firms leaves 9,101 firm-years. After merging with the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
and removing observations with missing control variables, the sample reduces to 7,535 firm-years. Combining 
with the antitakeover index from Riskmetrics and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) results in a further loss of 
data to deliver a final sample of 6,644 firm-year observations. As a robustness check, we re-estimate innovation 
regressions using the samples at alternative stages of our selection and confirm that sample attrition has little 
impact on our main findings. 
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To examine how female board representation affects the firm’s innovation activities, we 
estimate the following baseline empirical model: 
ln (Innovation i, t+1) =  +  × Fraction of female directors i, t 
     +  Z i, t + Industry i  + Year t  +  i, t                      (1) 
The measures of female board representation and Innovation are discussed in detail in the 
following subsections. Z is a vector of firm characteristics that affects innovation activities 
following the existing literature. Industry i represents industry fixed effects constructed using 
the Fama and French 49-industry classification and Year t captures the year fixed effects. 
 
2.2.1. Measuring female board representation  
The key independent variable of interest, female board representation, is measured either as 
the equally weighted or the tenure-weighted fraction of female directors on the board. The 
equally weighted fraction is calculated as the number of female directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. This measure has been used in the existing board gender 
composition literature (see for example Levi, Li and Zhang, 2014; Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 2011; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Extending the methodology of this literature, we pay more attention to the tenure-
weighted measure of female board representation calculated as the sum of tenures of female 
directors divided by the sum of tenures of all directors on the board. Essentially, the tenure-
weighted measure assigns higher weights to directors with longer tenures. This simple 
adjustment makes the measure preferable for at least two reasons. First, Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) show that directors with longer tenures are more active monitors who are 
more likely to take some type of action (such as requesting further information or an update, 
taking an initiative, or voting against other directors). By emphasizing directors who are more 
experienced and active, our tenure-weighted measure should better capture the impact of 
female board representation on innovation through internal governance. 
The second reason is related to the potential concern of matching between female 
directors and firms with high innovative potential. Director gender is time-invariant, whereas 
a firm’s innovation prospects vary over time as its strategic resources and competitive 
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environment change. This suggests that the effect of matching between time-invariant 
director gender and time-varying firm characteristics is likely to be strongest when the 
director is first appointed (Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh, 2012). Therefore, by underweighting 
newly appointed directors, the tenure-weighted measure should be less affected by the 
matching problem, if it exists.  
For the above reasons, we report only the regression results using our tenure-weighted 
measure to keep the tables concise. We confirm that the results are similar when we use the 
equally weighted measure instead. Appendix B shows our main results using the equally 
weighted fraction of female directors.  
 
2.2.2. Measuring innovation 
We measure firms’ resource input into innovation activities by the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures following Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013). Firm-years with missing 
R&D information are assigned a zero value. While the input-oriented measure is 
straightforward, it fails to capture the quality of innovation. Therefore, we apply the output-
oriented measures of patent count and citations to capture how effectively a firm has utilized 
its innovation inputs.   
Both patent count and citations are constructed using the 2006 edition of the NBER 
patent database, which covers over 3 million patent grants and over 23 million citations 
between 1976 and 2006 (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). Patents are included in the 
database only if they are eventually granted. Therefore, our first measure of innovation output 
is a firm’s number of patent applications filed in a year that are eventually granted. When 
constructing this measure, we use a patent’s application year rather than the grant year 
because the former is a better indicator of the actual timing of innovation (Griliches, Pakes 
and Hall, 1988). 
Patent count, however, may not be sufficient to capture innovation productivity because 
patents vary considerably in their technological and economic importance. To assess a 
patent’s importance, we use its citation count as our second measure of innovation output. 
Citation counts are related to the social and economic value created by the innovation 
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(Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). For each firm, the citation-based 
measure is constructed as the total number of non-self citations ultimately received by the 
patents applied for in a given year.  
The NBER patent database suffers from several imperfections: i) it takes time for an 
applied patent to be granted and, hence, there is a truncation bias in the number of patents 
towards the end of the sample period; ii) patents created near the ending year of the sample 
tend to have fewer citations simply because they have less time to accumulate them; and iii) 
both patenting and citation intensities vary across industries (Seru, 2014; Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2001). To address these concerns, we follow Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) 
and Seru (2014) and adjust both patent and citation counts.  
First, to adjust for the truncation in patent count, we divide the number of patents for 
each firm by the average patent count of all firms in the same technology class (which is a 
finer industry classification used by USPTO to assign patents) and year. The adjusted 
variable is named Patent. Second, each patent’s non-self citation count is scaled by the mean 
non-self citation count of all patents in the same technology class and year. The variable 
Citation is the sum of the adjusted citation counts across all patents applied for by a firm in a 
given year. We use the natural logarithm of one plus Patent (Citation) for regression 
purposes because the distribution of patent counts (citations) in the sample is right-skewed. 
 
2.2.3. Control variables 
We include several firm characteristics that are related to innovation. First, firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization. As argued by previous studies, 
there may be economies of scale in generating patents due to the fixed costs of maintaining a 
legal department that deals with Intellectual Property (IP)-related issues (Lerner, 1995; Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001), suggesting a positive relation between firm size and patenting activities. 
Second, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that capital intensity can affect a firm’s patenting 
behavior as it increases the importance of patents in safeguarding against the threat of costly 
litigation. We define capital intensity as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. Third, Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that the majority of female directors act as 
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independent directors. Thus, we control for board independence, defined as the fraction of 
independent directors on boards, to rule out the possibility that effects of monitoring on 
innovation may be driven by independent directors rather than female directors. Furthermore, 
following existing studies (He and Tian, 2013; Tian and Wang, 2014), we also control for 
other standard determinants of innovation including profitability (ROA), growth 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and leverage. Finally, when analyzing patents and citations we also 
control for R&D expenditures to avoid confounding the effect of female board representation 
with the effect of innovation input. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
2.2.4. Where does board gender composition variation come from? 
The panel data we use include both time-series and cross-sectional variations in the fraction 
of female directors on the board, innovation measures and other control variables. However, 
from a statistical point of view, our main source of variation likely comes from the cross 
section because our sample consists of 1,224 firms, but only 9 years (from 1998 to 2006) due 
to limited data availability. The disproportionately large number of firms in the cross section 
compared with the number of years suggests that cross-sectional variation in board gender 
composition across firms dominates its variation over time. 
Moreover, many firms in our sample experienced little temporal changes in board 
gender composition. On average, the equally weighted fraction of female directors changes 
by 0.0056 from year to year. Of the 1,224 firms in our sample, there are 401 firms (32.76%) 
whose fraction of female directors did not change during our sample period and 207 firms 
(16.91%) who experienced only one change. The lack of within-firm variation works against 
finding a significant relation between female board representation and innovation in firm 
fixed effects regressions (Zhou, 2001). For these reasons, we estimate OLS regressions to 
capture the female-representation-innovation relation. To address endogeneity problems in 
our analysis, we focus on the instrumental variables approach described in Section 4.2. 
 
3. Female board representation and innovation 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample, as well as the subsamples of 
firms with and without female directors. A firm with at least one female director on the board 
has, on average, about twice as many patents and approximately 1.5 times as many citations 
as a firm with no female directors. The differences are statistically significant, suggesting that 
female board representation increases innovation. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The mean (median) equally weighted fraction of female directors is 9.3% (10%), and is 
6.9% (3.7%) for the tenure-weighted measure. This is close to the 8.5% mean (equally 
weighted) reported by Adams and Ferreira (2009). With respect to the control variables, firms 
with female directors are larger and have higher leverage, lower Tobin’s q, better 
performance in terms of ROA, higher fraction of independent directors and more tangible 
assets than firms without female directors. These results are all comparable to those of 
Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
 
3.2. Baseline empirical results 
Table 2 tests whether firms with higher fractions of female directors devote more resources to 
innovation activities. The results suggest that, with and without controls, the tenure-weighted 
measure of female board representation is positively related to R&D expenditures. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 3 examines the relation between female board representation and innovation 
productivity, as measured by patent and citation counts. All coefficients on the gender 
composition variable are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with 
greater representation of female directors generate more patents and citations. In terms of 
economic significance, the results in models 1 and 3 suggest that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in the tenure-weighted fraction of female directors is associated with approximately 
6% more patents and 7% more citations.  
13 
 
Importantly, conditioning on R&D spending (in models 2 and 4) slightly reduces the 
coefficients on our gender composition variable, suggesting that the main effect of female 
board representation is to improve the effectiveness of innovation activities rather than to 
increase R&D investments.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
3.3. Robustness tests 
Robustness test results (unreported) confirm that the positive effect of board female 
representation on innovation persists when (i) Tobit, Poisson and Fama-MacBeth regressions 
are used, (ii) the sample period is curtailed at 2003 as the patent and citation data for the last 
three years available in the patent database may be incomplete, (iii) firm-years with female 
CEOs are excluded to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by female CEOs 
rather than female directors, 6  (iv) firm-years for Telecom and Utilities, where female 
directors are more prevalent, are excluded, (v) the alternative citations per patent measure of 
innovation is used,7 (vi) additional board composition measures including Fraction of foreign 
directors, Tenure diversity and Age diversity are controlled for, 8  and (vii) firm-years in 
industries with below median average citations per patent are excluded to account for the 
possibility that low citations do not necessarily equate to low impact. 
 
4. Identification 
The endogenous nature of corporate boards makes the interpretation of the estimated positive 
relation between female board representation and innovation difficult. It is hard to distinguish 
whether our findings are driven by an effect of female directors on innovation or by matching 
between female directors and firms with high innovation potential. For instance, our 
estimates may be biased due to either innovative firms being more responsive to external 
                                                          
6 Matsa and Miller (2011) and Tate and Yang (2015) show that the presence of females as CEOs and their 
presence as directors are highly correlated. 
7 This is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations per patent. 
8 Fraction of foreign directors is defined as the ratio of the number of non-US directors to board size. Age 
(Tenure) diversity is calculated as the standard deviation of director age (tenure) divided by the average age 
(tenure) of directors on the board. 
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calls for greater female board representation or female directors self-selecting better 
performing innovative firms (Farrell and Hersch, 2005). To mitigate this concern, we employ 
two approaches: propensity score matching mitigates the matching concern based on 
observable firm characteristics and instrumental variable regressions address reverse 
causality. 
 
4.1. Propensity score matching estimates 
We use propensity score matching to identify a control sample of firms with no female 
directors on their boards, which exhibit virtually no differences in firm characteristics relative 
to firms with female directors. We first estimate a logit model where the dependent variable 
is an indicator for the presence of female directors.9 Independent variables include firm size, 
Tobin’s q, leverage, capital intensity (PPE/TA), return on assets (ROA), board independence 
(Fraction of independent directors), R&D expenditures (R&D/TA) as well as industry and 
year effects. We then construct a treatment group and a control group of firms using the 
nearest-neighbor method based on the predicted probabilities (or propensity score) from the 
logit regression. Specifically, each firm with female directors on its board (the treatment 
group) is matched to a firm without female directors (the control group) with the closest 
propensity score. If a firm in the control group is matched to more than one firm in the 
treatment group, we retain only the pair for which the difference in the two firms’ propensity 
scores is the smallest.10 To ensure further that firms in the treatment and control groups are 
sufficiently indistinguishable, we require that the maximum difference between the 
propensity score of a treatment firm and its matched control firm does not exceed 0.001 in 
absolute value. Eventually, we have 1,470 unique pairs of matched observations.   
We conduct two diagnostic tests to verify that firms in the treatment and control groups 
are indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics. The results are presented in 
Appendix C. First, we re-estimate the logit model restricted to the matched sample. We find 
that none of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant, suggesting that there are no 
                                                          
9 The results are quantitatively similar when we use a probit model in the first step. 
10 As a robustness test we allow control firms to be matched to multiple treatment firms. We find that matching 
with replacement results in estimates that are of greater economic and statistical significance. 
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distinguishable trends in innovation outcomes between the matched groups of firms. Second, 
we examine the difference between observable characteristics of the treatment firms and 
those of the matched control firms. Again, none of the differences are statistically significant.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 reports the propensity score matching estimates. The results indicate that firms 
with female directors generate approximately 7.7% more patents and 6.5% more citations 
than the matched firms without female directors. Thus, we conclude that matching between 
female directors and firms, at least based on observable characteristics, does not explain our 
findings. However, it is important to note that the matching approach does not allow us to 
account for differences between the treatment and control groups that could arise from 
unobservable factors. 
 
4.2. Instrumental variable estimates  
In addition, we employ the instrumental variables approach to extract the exogenous 
component of female board representation and use it to explain innovation outcomes. 
Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), we instrument for female board representation using 
the fraction of a firm’s male directors who sit on other boards that have at least one female 
director.11 Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Adams and Ragunathan (2015) argue that male 
directors with more balanced connections to women may be better able to identify suitable 
female candidates for directorships, implying a positive relation between the instrument and 
the fraction of women on the board. On the other hand, it is not obvious why knowing more 
women and having more balanced connections should be correlated with corporate 
innovation other than through board gender composition, accounting for various other factors. 
Therefore, we believe that the instrument used has at least some theoretical justification, 
although meanwhile we are mindful of the fact that it is never possible to completely rule out 
violations of the exclusion restriction. 
                                                          
11 The instrumental variable is constructed on a yearly basis. Its average change is 0.0029 from year to year. 
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Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of first-stage regressions where the dependent 
variable is the tenure-weighted fraction of female directors. For brevity, we report only the 
coefficients on the instrument. Consistent with our prediction, the reported coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. In addition, the p-values of Cragg-Donald’s Wald F 
weak-instrument test statistics are 0.000, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
weak (Cragg and Donald, 1993; Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the second-stage regression results where the dependent 
variables are the number of patents and citations, respectively. The main variables of interest 
are the predicted values of the fraction of female directors. Their coefficient estimates are 
positive and significant, confirming our baseline results.  
Comparing the IV regression results with the baseline OLS regression results in Table 3, 
we find that the magnitudes of IV estimates are larger than those of OLS estimates (although 
the estimates from both approaches are positive and statistically significant), suggesting that 
OLS regressions bias the estimates downward. This finding suggests that some omitted 
variables may simultaneously make firms more innovative and female directors less desirable, 
resulting in the downward bias embedded in the OLS estimates. Once the endogeneity in 
board gender composition is alleviated using the instrument, the estimates increase, i.e., 
become more positive, in IV regressions.12 
A potential concern with the interpretation of the results is that Fraction of male 
directors linked to female directors might capture the connectedness of the board and bias our 
results. Indeed, well-connected directors with multiple directorships are likely to be those 
who are better able to perform their monitoring and advising roles as directors, which could 
be correlated with corporate innovation. To address this concern, we follow Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and control for a more direct measure of board connectedness, namely, the 
                                                          
12 Another possible explanation is that IV estimates may produce an effect that is significantly larger than the 
true population average treatment effect for legitimate econometric reasons because they uncover a “local 
average treatment effect” (LATE). See Wei (2017) for more details. 
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total number of external board seats held by directors. We confirm (unreported) that the 
results are robust to the inclusion of this additional control. 
Another alternative explanation is related to selection, it might be harder for women to 
get on the board than it is for men. If so, it could be the case that those females that break 
through the glass ceiling are more qualified than their male counterparts. While director 
quality is difficult to measure, Adams and Ragunathan (2015) provide supportive evidence 
that female directors on average have higher educational qualifications than male directors, 
which we confirm using our data. Continuing this logic, a male director linked with other 
female directors may also be of higher quality, to the extent that board members have similar 
levels of qualification within a firm as a result of the firm’s choice of hiring practices. In that 
case, Fraction of male directors linked to female directors becomes a proxy for board quality. 
To mitigate this concern, we control for more direct and standard measures of board quality 
based on directors’ education. Following Adams and Ragunathan (2015), we define 
Education as the highest educational qualification attained by a director. A bachelor’s degree 
is coded as 1, a master’s degree as 2, and a PhD as 3.13 We re-examine the IV regression 
results after controlling for Education and find that our results are not materially affected, 
suggesting that this alternative explanation does not drive our findings. 
 
5. Quiet life versus career concerns 
In this section, we investigate the mechanisms through which greater monitoring enhances 
innovation, which purport two explanations.14 The first is that managers prefer a quiet life 
and thus are reluctant to innovate (Hart, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Greater 
monitoring by female directors mitigates the agency problem, reduces managers’ incentives 
                                                          
13 As an alternative, we also use other measures of education and find quantitatively similar results. Board MBA 
is the fraction of directors with an MBA degree. Board Ivy is the fraction of directors who have attended an Ivy 
League university. Board qualification is the fraction of directors with professional qualifications. 
14 A pre-requisite to this demands evidence that female board representation increases monitoring. In unreported 
results, we confirm the established findings that female directors tend to have better attendance records than 
male directors and that male directors are less likely to have attendance problems when there are female 
directors on the board. Female directors are more likely to sit on monitoring-related committees than male 
directors. Together, these results suggest that boards with female directors allocate more effort to monitoring. In 
terms of monitoring outcome, we find that female directors are associated with a higher sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to stock performance. 
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to shirk and keeps them focused on pursuing innovative and valuable projects (the quiet life 
hypothesis).  
An alternative explanation is based on the career concern model of Aghion, Van 
Reenen and Zingales (2013). Absent monitoring, the board infers a manager’s ability from 
the revenue realization, which can be negative for purely stochastic reasons rather than poor 
managerial ability. However, monitoring and observing managers innovate provides the 
board with an opportunity to assess the manager’s ability independent of and before the 
revenue realization. Thus, in the presence of female directors who allocate more effort to 
monitoring and acquiring information about managers’ ability through observing them 
innovate, the manager may have greater incentive to undertake innovative projects to reveal 
their ability knowing that they are insulated against the reputational risk of random negative 
revenue shocks (Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013).  
Both the quiet life and the career concern hypotheses predict that increased monitoring 
by female directors stimulates innovation. Where the two hypotheses differ is in the interplay 
between: i) female board representation and product market competition, and ii) female board 
representation and CEO entrenchment.  
 
5.1. Female board representation and product market competition 
Product market competition increases the difficulty of survival and thereby forces the 
manager to work harder (Hart, 1983). Under the quiet life hypothesis, product market 
competition and female board representation are substitutes. The more competitive a market 
is, the less managerial slack there should be and the less need there is for greater monitoring 
by female directors. Thus, the quiet life hypothesis predicts that the impact of female board 
representation on innovation should be stronger in industries in which competition is low. 
In contrast, under the career concern hypothesis, product market competition and 
female board representation are complements. When competition is higher, corporate 
outcomes become more uncertain, which increases the reputational risk faced by the manager 
(Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013). If female directors stimulate innovation by 
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insulating the manager against the reputational risk from bad revenue realizations, this effect 
should be stronger in industries with high competition. 
Following Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009), we employ the US census measures of 
industry concentration that are constructed using data from all public and private firms in an 
industry. 15  We hand-collect the eight-firm concentration ratio from the Census of 
Manufactures publications.16 The eight-firm ratio is calculated as the sales of the eight largest 
firms in a 5-digit NAICS industry divided by the total sales of all firms in that industry.17 The 
more concentrated an industry is, the less intense the competition in that industry.  
We estimate the innovation regressions separately for firms in low-competition 
industries and those in high-competition industries. An industry is classified as having low 
competition if its eight-firm concentration ratio is above the sample median for that year, and 
vice versa. Table 6 presents the results where Panels A and B report results for the number of 
patents and citations, respectively. Using both OLS and IV estimation, we find that the 
positive effects of female board representation on innovation are more prominent in low-
competition industries. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
5.2. Female board representation and managerial entrenchment 
A further implication of the quiet life hypothesis is that the greater monitoring by female 
directors should be particularly important when managers are entrenched. In such 
circumstances, female board representation should have a more prominent positive effect on 
innovation. On the contrary, the career concern hypothesis predicts that the effect of female 
board representation on innovation should be weaker when managers are more entrenched, or 
                                                          
15 Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) note that industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, 
which exclude data on private firms, are poor proxies for actual industry concentration and may lead to incorrect 
conclusions. In contrast, the corresponding US census measures are constructed based on all public and private 
firms in an industry and hence better capture actual industry concentration. See Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) for 
more details. 
16 The Census of Manufactures is published only during years when a US Census takes place. Thus, we hand-
collect concentration ratios for the years 1997, 2002 and 2007. Following prior studies, we use the US census 
data for a given year as a proxy of industry concentration not only for that year but also for the one or two years 
immediately before and after it (as in Ali, Klasa and Yeung, 2009; Klasa, Ortiz-Molina, Serfling and Srinivasan, 
2014; Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell, 2007). For instance, we use the 2002 Census of Manufactures data as a 
proxy for industry concentration for the period 2000–2004. 
17 We also use four-firm, twenty-firm and fifty-firm concentration ratios and our results still hold. 
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shareholders and the board have less power to restrain managers (Aghion, Van Reenen and 
Zingales, 2013). We use the antitakeover index introduced by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) to capture firms’ managerial entrenchment, with higher index values indicating higher 
degrees of managerial entrenchment. 18  Table 7 reports the innovation regression results 
separately for firms with a high and low antitakeover index based on the sample median. The 
results suggest that the positive effect of female board representation on innovation is 
concentrated on high antitakeover index firms where managers are more entrenched. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Overall, the results suggest that the positive effect of female board representation on 
innovation is more prominent when product market competition is lower and when managers 
are more entrenched, consistent with the quiet life hypothesis and contrary to the career 
concern hypothesis. In further unreported robustness analysis, we use CEO tenure as an 
alternative measure of managerial entrenchment. Entrenchment should increase with tenure 
because a longer tenure allows CEOs to enhance their internal power (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989) and to make manager-specific investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Moreover, the disciplining power of reputation for CEOs nearing retirement is relatively 
weak (Murphy, 1986). The quiet life hypothesis predicts that the positive effect of female 
board representation on corporate innovation should be stronger in firms with high tenure 
CEOs and our results confirm this.  
 
5.3. Further robustness checks and discussion 
We conduct additional analyses to ensure further that differences in director quality and/or 
other observable characteristics cannot explain our main findings. In Appendix D, we first 
                                                          
18 The antitakeover index is constructed on the basis of the six provisions that set constitutional limits on 
shareholder voting power and strengthen the protections against takeovers that managers have. Of the six 
provisions, four of them set constitutional limits on shareholder voting power. They include: staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments. Two other provisions that strengthen the protections that managers have 
on takeovers are poison pills and golden parachute arrangements. Each company is given a score, from 0 to 6, 
based on the number of these provisions that the company has in the given year. The higher the index value the 
more entrenched managers are likely to be in a firm. See Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) for more details. 
The data for the antitakeover index are available only for 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 during our sample period. 
We therefore fill the gaps using the most recent value available at that point in the sample. 
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compare several observable dimensions of director characteristics between firms with female 
directors and those without. We find suggestive evidence that firms with female directors 
tend to have directors with better education and shorter tenure. We then include additional 
board-level controls for these director characteristics in both the OLS and IV regressions. The 
additional controls include the fraction of directors with an MBA degree (Board MBA), the 
fraction of directors who have attended an Ivy League university (Board Ivy), the fraction of 
directors with professional qualifications (Board qualification) as well as Average director 
age and Average director tenure. It is reassuring that, after including these controls, the 
significantly positive effect of female board representation on corporate innovation remains. 
A potential alternative explanation why female board representation is positively 
associated with innovation is that, in general, heterogeneous groups should produce a broader 
range of human capital, including ideas and skills, and social capital, such as network 
resources, promote creativity and ultimately lead to increased innovation, as argued by Miller 
and Triana (2009). 19  Given that heterogeneity in human and social capital is largely 
unobserved, it is hard to test explicitly whether this explanation affects our results. However, 
this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the findings of our split sample analysis in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2.  
Furthermore, the benefits generated by female directors due to their greater monitoring 
and increased group heterogeneity are not mutually exclusive. Differences in networks and 
backgrounds between male executives and female directors may facilitate board 
independence and thus effective monitoring. Cognizant of this, we conduct further tests to 
provide evidence that greater monitoring by female directors matters beyond increased group 
heterogeneity. First, we separate female directors that are corporate insiders from those who 
are relatively independent from the firm. We compute Fraction of female indep. directors 
(Fraction of female exe. directors) as the number of female independent (executive) directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the board. We also control for Fraction of male 
exe. directors, defined as the number of male executive directors divided by board size, such 
                                                          
19 The predicted effect of group heterogeneity on innovation could also be negative if more dissimilar directors 
create more disagreement and conflict, which could impair innovation efficiency (Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
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that the holdout, reference group is comprised of male independent directors. Unlike 
executive directors that are affiliated with the firm, independent directors have no significant 
relationship with the firm beyond being directors, which enables them to be objective and 
valuable monitors (Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011). Our results (unreported) show that 
the positive effect of female board representation on innovation is driven by female 
independent directors, consistent with monitoring mitigating agency issues. Moreover, female 
independent directors appear to have a significantly larger impact than male independent 
directors as evident by the positive and significant coefficients on Fraction of female indep. 
directors, suggesting that director independence alone cannot explain our findings. 
Second, we distinguish between pre- and post-CEO female directors. A director is pre-
CEO (post-CEO) if she is appointed before (after) the current CEO assumes office. We 
calculate Fraction of female pre-CEO directors (Fraction of female post-CEO directors) as 
the number of pre-CEO (post-CEO) female directors divided by the total number of directors 
on the board. Again, we control for Fraction of male post-CEO directors (calculated as the 
number of post-CEO male directors divided by board size) to make male pre-CEO directors 
the holdout group. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2014) and Khanna, Kim and Lu (2015) show 
that directors appointed after the CEO are more likely to assign their allegiance to the CEO 
who hired and promoted them to their current position, which reduces monitoring 
effectiveness. Consistent with the agency view, our unreported results suggest that the 
positive effect of female board representation on innovation stems from female directors who 
joined before the current CEO who are relatively more effective at monitoring. In addition, 
the finding that female pre-CEO directors have a stronger impact than male pre-CEO 
directors seems to suggest that the observed effects are related to gender. 
Third, we classify female directors as busy or non-busy. Following Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) a director is defined as busy if she holds three or more directorships, and non-busy 
otherwise. We calculate Fraction of female busy directors (Fraction of female non-busy 
directors) as the number of female busy (non-busy) directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. We control for Fraction of male busy directors, with male non-busy 
directors as the holdout group. Whilst busy directors are inclined to become distracted, 
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resulting in ineffective monitoring (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Core, Holthausen and Larcher, 
1999), they are also more experienced, better connected, and therefore better positioned to 
provide advice than are non-busy directors (Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan, 2013). Our 
unreported results show that the positive effect of female board representation on innovation 
is concentrated on female non-busy directors, again consistent with monitoring alleviating 
agency problems. Further, female non-busy directors have a more prominent impact than 
male non-busy directors, suggesting that director busyness alone does not drive our results. 
In summary, these additional findings considering different aspects of female board 
representation are difficult to reconcile with the interpretation that female directors increase 
firm innovation due to the breadth of human and social capital associated with heterogeneous 
groups. The quiet life hypothesis, instead, is consistent with all of our findings. However, it is 
important to recognize that our analysis does not allow us to completely rule out alternative 
interpretations in general. Rather, we argue based on our evidence that the relationship 
between female board representation and innovation is most consistent with the quiet life 
hypothesis. 
 
6. Female board representation, innovation and firm performance 
Our results suggest that firms with greater representation of female directors invest more in 
innovation and achieve greater innovative success. More important is an examination of 
whether this matters sufficiently to affect firm performance. Table 8 reports the results of 
such investigation. Dependent variables are the average return on assets for the subsequent 
year, three years and five years for Panel A, and the average Tobin’s q for the subsequent 
year, three years and five years for Panel B. The variable of interest is the tenure-weighted 
fraction of female directors. Following prior literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcher, 1999; Bhaget and Bolton, 2008), we add a rich set of firm and 
governance controls known to be related to firm performance including ln(Sales), Leverage, 
PPE/TA, R&D/TA, No. of business segments, Fraction of independent directors, Board size 
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and Antitakeover index.20 Detailed variable definitions are given in the Appendix A. For 
brevity, we report only the coefficients on the variables of interest. To mitigate the 
endogeneity of board gender composition in performance regressions, we run IV regressions 
in addition to OLS regressions using the same instrument as in Table 5. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
The results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that in general, female directors do not 
improve firm value as the coefficient estimates on the fraction of female directors are not 
significant. Next, we investigate the possibility that the value of female board representation 
depends on the relative importance of innovation activities among firms’ corporate strategies. 
Given that our previous findings suggest that firms with female directors achieve greater 
innovation, an intuitive implication is that greater innovative success should be more likely to 
translate into better performance in industries where firm growth is particularly dependent on 
innovation.  
In a report by the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) and the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), 75 four-digit NAICS industries (from among 313 in total) 
are identified as IP-intensive industries.21 IP-intensive industries are those that produce or use 
significant amounts of intellectual property, including innovation, creation, and commercial 
distinctiveness, and rely most intensely on patents, copyrights and trademarks to protect 
them.22 By identifying and analyzing IP-intensive industries using data from both private and 
public firms, the report promotes a better understanding of industries in which innovation and 
                                                          
20 In further unreported analysis, we repeat the regressions in Table 8 using a range of alternative model 
specifications. First, we use the firm’s market capitalization and total assets as alternative measures of firm size 
in place of sales. Second, we use the same controls as those in Tables 9 to 11 of Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
(specifically, Board size, Fraction of independent directors, ln(sales), No. of business segments). Third, we 
include the same controls as our previous tables (ln(MVE), Leverage, PPE/TA, Fraction of independent 
directors, R&D/TA). All of these tests confirm that our findings are not much affected by these alternative 
specifications. 
21  Seventy-five IP-intensive industries emerge after combing through the lists of patent, trademark, and 
copyright intensive industries. Each list consists of a subset of industries that had high scores in various intensity 
measures regarding patents, trademarks or copyrights, respectively. See ESA and USPTO (2012) for more 
details. 
22 Patents, trademarks, and copyrights are the primary ways of establishing ownership of inventions and creative 
ideas, providing a legal foundation to generate tangible benefits from innovation for companies, workers, and 
consumers. This framework provides the incentives to undertake investments in innovation and therefore is a 
key force for promoting innovation (ESA and USPTO, 2012).  
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creativity play a particularly important role (ESA and USPTO, 2012). Hence, we expect the 
relation between female board representation and firm performance to be positive and 
significant in IP-intensive industries and insignificant or even negative in non-IP-intensive 
industries. 
We split the sample to test the effect of female board representation on firm 
performance in IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive industries. The results are reported in 
columns (3) to (6) of Table 8.23 Women on boards are particularly valuable in IP-intensive 
industries as evidenced by the positive and often significant coefficient estimates in columns 
(3) and (4). The top four industries where female board representation creates value via 
increasing corporate innovation are pharmaceuticals, computer software, electronic 
equipment, and chemicals. In contrast, coefficient estimates in columns (5) and (6) suggest 
that female board representation does not affect, or even undermines, firm performance in 
non-IP-intensive industries which include, among others, transportation, wholesale, retail, 
and hotels and restaurants.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We find that firms with greater representation of female directors invest more in innovation 
and achieve greater innovative success, as measured by patent and citation counts, for given 
R&D expenditures. In other words, the R&D expenditures in firms with female directors are 
more productive in generating innovation. These findings are robust to the use of alternative 
measures of board gender composition, econometric specifications and subsamples.  
To investigate the potential mechanisms through which female directors affect 
corporate innovation, we explore the heterogeneity in the innovation effect of female board 
representation. The positive relation between female board representation and innovation is 
stronger when product market competition is less intense and when managers are more 
entrenched, which are consistent with the hypothesis that female directors improve the 
                                                          
23 We exclude industry effects in all subsample tests in Table 8 to avoid potential inconsistency between the 
Fama-French 49 industry classification and the NAICS industry classification. As a robustness check, we repeat 
the subsample analysis with industry effects constructed based on the two-digit NAICS industry classification. 
The results are not materially changed. 
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incentives to innovate by increasing oversight over managers. Finally, we find that female 
representation on the board does not add value on average. However, female directors appear 
to be valuable for industries in which innovation and creativity are particularly relevant, 
reinforcing the importance of the role of women on boards for impacting corporate 
innovation.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
The table presents the means and medians of main variables. ln(1+R&D) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D expenditures. ln(1+Patent) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents (Patent) filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the total number of non-self citations (Citation) received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. Fraction of female directors_EW 
(Fraction of female directors_TW) is the equally weighted (tenure-weighted) measure of the fraction of female directors on the board. ln(MVE) is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum 
of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent directors is the number of independent directors divided by the total number 
of directors on the board. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences 
between the means (medians) for firms with at least one female director on the board and firms without female directors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  
Whole Sample  
N=6,644 
 
Firm-Year Obs. with 
Female Directors 
N=4,260 
 
Firm-Year Obs. without 
Female Directors 
N=2,384 
Variables  Mean  Median  Stdev  Mean  Median  Stdev  Mean  Median  Stdev 
Innovation Measures                   
ln(1+R&D)  2.06  0.50  2.34  2.08  0.00  2.49  2.02  1.98  2.04 
ln(1+Patent)  0.64  0.00  1.14  0.70  0.00  1.23  0.53***  0.00*  0.94 
ln(1+Citation)  0.61  0.00  1.28  0.64  0.00  1.34  0.56**  0.00  1.18 
Patent  5.41  0.00  20.74  6.71  0.00  23.48  3.10***  0.00*  14.32 
Citation  9.99  0.00  50.91  11.40  0.00  54.92  7.48***  0.00  42.72 
                   
Female Board Representation Measures                   
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.09  0.10  0.09  0.14  0.13  0.06  0.00***  0.00***  0.00 
Fraction of female directors_TW  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.00***  0.00***  0.00 
                   
Main Controls                   
ln(MVE)  7.60  7.43  1.53  7.98  7.85  1.58  6.93***  6.82***  1.19 
Tobin’s Q  2.03  1.55  1.37  2.00  1.52  1.38  2.09**  1.62***  1.36 
Leverage  0.23  0.24  0.16  0.25  0.26  0.15  0.20***  0.19***  0.17 
PPE/TA  0.33  0.27  0.23  0.35  0.30  0.23  0.30***  0.23***  0.23 
ROA  0.15  0.14  0.08  0.15  0.14  0.08  0.14***  0.14***  0.09 
Fraction of independent directors  0.66  0.67  0.17  0.69  0.71  0.16  0.61***  0.63***  0.18 
R&D/TA  0.03  0.00  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.04  0.04***  0.01***  0.06 
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Table 2 
Female board representation and R&D expenditures 
 
Table 2 presents the OLS regression results on the relation between female board representation and R&D 
expenditures. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D expenditures in a given 
year. Independent variables include: Fraction of female directors_TW is the tenure-weighted measure of the fraction 
of female directors on the board. ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market 
value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-
term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of 
independent directors is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable unless otherwise specified. All 
regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry 
classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
   ln(1+R&D) 
Independent Variables   1  2 
Intercept    2.691**  -1.192 
   (1.164)  (0.888) 
Fraction of female directors_TW    3.686***  1.022** 
   (0.614)  (0.420) 
ln(MVE)     0.579*** 
     (0.039) 
Tobin’s Q     0.002 
     (0.035) 
Leverage     -0.106 
     (0.269) 
PPE/TA     -1.248*** 
     (0.293) 
ROA     -1.498*** 
     (0.486) 
Fraction of independent directors     0.736*** 
     (0.207) 
      
Industry effects   Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.   6,644  6,644 
Adj. R2   0.598  0.720 
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Table 3 
Female board representation and innovation productivity 
 
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results on the relation between female board representation and innovation 
productivity. Dependent variables include: ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. Independent 
variables include: Fraction of female directors_TW is the tenure-weighted measure of the fraction of female 
directors on the board. ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity 
plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-
term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent 
directors is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. R&D/TA is 
R&D expenditures divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent 
variable unless otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
   ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables   1 2  3 4 
Intercept    -1.726*** -1.964***  -0.921*** -1.129*** 
   (0.350) (0.334)  (0.200) (0.196) 
Fraction of female directors_TW    0.601*** 0.582**  0.663*** 0.624*** 
   (0.228) (0.227)  (0.211) (0.211) 
ln(MVE)   0.329*** 0.338***  0.294*** 0.307*** 
   (0.025) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Tobin’s Q   -0.004 -0.043**  0.026 -0.027 
   (0.020) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.024) 
Leverage   0.017 0.112  -0.026 0.090 
   (0.147) (0.144)  (0.156) (0.151) 
PPE/TA   -0.194 -0.188  -0.323* -0.288* 
   (0.185) (0.181)  (0.179) (0.172) 
ROA   -0.334 0.135  -0.208 0.410 
   (0.244) (0.242)  (0.276) (0.280) 
Fraction of independent directors   0.416*** 0.367***  0.331** 0.258* 
   (0.127) (0.123)  (0.140) (0.136) 
R&D/TA    4.274***   5.706*** 
    (0.663)   (0.747) 
        
Industry effects   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs.   6,644 6,644  6,644 6,644 
Adj. R2   0.490 0.503  0.439 0.457 
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Table 4 
Female board representation and corporate innovation: Propensity score matching 
 
Table 4 reports the average treatment effect estimates. ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total 
number of patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the total number of non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
with Female Dirs. 
N=1,470 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
without Female Dirs. 
N=1,470 
 
Difference 
 
t-statistics 
ln(1+Patent)  0.610  0.533  0.077**  2.050 
ln(1+Citation)  0.608  0.543  0.065*  1.750 
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Table 5 
Female board representation and corporate innovation: Instrumental variables 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of instrumental variables methods using two-stage least square (2SLS) panel regressions. 
Panel A presents the first-stage regression results in which the dependent variable is the tenure-weighted fraction of 
female directors. The instrumental variable is Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, defined as the 
fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female director. The 
results for other controls are suppressed for brevity. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results. The 
dependent variables are: ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self 
citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. All other control variables are 
the same as those in the baseline models. Industry and year effects are included. Industry effects are constructed 
based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity 
robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. First-Stage Regressions    
Independent Variables   Fraction of female directors_TW 
Fraction of male directors linked to female directors   0.073*** 
   (0.010) 
    
Control Variables   Yes 
Industry effects   Yes 
Year effects   Yes 
No. of obs.   6,644 
CD Wald F-statistics   223.800*** 
Adj. R2   0.284 
Panel B. Second-Stage Regressions 
   ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables   1  2 
Intercept    -1.327***  -0.665** 
   (0.473)  (0.309) 
Fraction of female directors_TW    4.833***  3.678** 
   (1.452)  (1.515) 
ln(MVE)   0.282***  0.267*** 
   (0.031)  (0.032) 
Tobin’s Q   -0.012  -0.004 
   (0.024)  (0.027) 
Leverage   0.026  0.019 
   (0.154)  (0.159) 
PPE/TA   -0.112  -0.200 
   (0.191)  (0.182) 
ROA   -0.105  0.213 
   (0.277)  (0.300) 
Fraction of independent directors   -0.048  -0.041 
   (0.183)  (0.198) 
R&D/TA   4.160***  5.577*** 
   (0.723)  (0.774) 
      
Industry effects   Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.   6,644  6,644 
Adj. R2   0.422  0.424 
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Table 6 
Female board representation and product market competition 
 
Table 6 presents OLS and IV regression results separately for firms in low-competition industries and those in high-
competition industries. An industry is classified as having low competition if its eight-firm concentration ratio is 
above the sample median for that year, and vice versa. The eight-firm ratio is calculated as the sales of the eight 
largest firms in a 5-digit NAICS industry divided by the total sales of all firms in that industry. The dependent 
variable for Panel A is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and eventually 
granted) in a given year. The dependent variable for Panel B is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. The variable of interest 
is Fraction of female directors_TW, defined as the tenure-weighted measure of the fraction of female directors on 
the board. Other control variables are the same as those in the baseline models. For brevity, only the coefficient 
estimates on the variable of interest are presented. For IV regressions, the instrumental variable used is Fraction of 
male directors linked to female directors, defined as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other 
boards on which there is at least one female director. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry 
effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Low competition 
(N=3,856) 
 
High competitioin 
(N=2,788) 
 
OLS IV 
 
OLS IV 
  1 2   3 4 
Panel A: Dependent is ln(1+Patent) 
Fraction of female directors_TW 0.812*** 7.099*** 
 
0.256 2.839 
 
(0.284) (2.395) 
 
(0.357) (1.776) 
    
      Panel B: Dependent is ln(1+Citations) 
Fraction of female directors_TW 0.802*** 4.844** 
 
0.162 1.619 
 
(0.281) (2.211) 
 
(0.327) (1.996) 
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Table 7 
Female board representation and CEO entrenchment 
 
Table 7 presents OLS and IV regression results separately for firms with different levels of managerial entrenchment. 
We measure managerial entrenchment by the antitakeover index introduced by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) 
and it is constructed based on six provisions. A firm is in the high antitakeover index (more entrenched) group if its 
antitakeover index is above the sample median, and vice versa. The dependent variable for Panel A is the natural 
logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. The dependent 
variable for Panel B is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received on a firm’s 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. The variable of interest is Fraction of female directors_TW, 
defined as the tenure-weighted measure of the fraction of female directors on the board. Other control variables are 
the same as those in the baseline models. For brevity, only the coefficient estimates on the variable of interest are 
presented. For IV regressions, the instrumental variable used is Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, 
defined as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female 
director. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-
French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered 
standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
High antitakeover index 
(N=3,329) 
 
Low antitakeover index 
(N=3,315) 
    
 
OLS IV 
 
OLS IV 
  1 2   3 4 
Panel A: Dependent is ln(1+Patent) 
Fraction of female directors_TW 0.583** 5.901*** 
 
0.022 4.025 
 
(0.244) (1.688) 
 
(0.401) (2.939) 
    
      Panel B: Dependent is ln(1+Citations) 
Fraction of female directors_TW 0.570** 5.499*** 
 
-0.234 -0.073 
 
(0.242) (1.841) 
 
(0.373) (3.075) 
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Table 8 
Female board representation, corporate innovation and firm performance 
 
Table 8 presents the OLS and IV regressions results on the relation between female board representation and subsequent firm performance. Dependent variables 
are the average return on assets for the subsequent year, three years and five years for Panel A, and the average Tobin’s q for the subsequent year, three years and 
five years for Panel B. The variable of interest is Fraction of female directors_TW, defined as the tenure-weighted measure of the fraction of female directors on 
the board. Other control variables include ln(Sales), Leverage, PPE/TA, R&D/TA, No. of business segments, Fraction of independent directors, Board size and 
Antitakeover index. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. For brevity, only the coefficient estimates on the variable of interest are presented. 
For IV regressions, the instrumental variable used is Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, defined as the fraction of male directors on the board 
who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female director. An industry is classified as IP-Intensive if it is one of the 75 IP-intensive industries 
identified by the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and Non-IP-Intensive otherwise. IP-
intensive industries are those that are particularly dependent on patent, copyright, or trademark protection. All regressions include year effects. Industry effects 
are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Full Sample 
 
IP-Intensive Industries 
 
Non-IP-Intensive Industries 
    OLS IV   OLS IV   OLS IV 
  1 2  3 4  5 6 
Panel A. Average ROA for Subsequent Year 
One Year   Fraction of female directors_TW 0.015 0.001 
 
0.072** 0.122 
 
-0.048* -0.289 
 
 
(0.021) (0.142) 
 
(0.031) (0.159) 
 
(0.025) (0.231) 
            
Three Years Fraction of female directors_TW 0.017 0.095 
 
0.078*** 0.242* 
 
-0.055** -0.197 
 
 
(0.021) (0.144) 
 
(0.030) (0.136) 
 
(0.027) (0.258) 
            
Five Years   Fraction of female directors_TW 0.018 0.196 
 
0.091*** 0.290** 
 
-0.067** -0.098 
 
 
(0.021) (0.143) 
 
(0.029) (0.145) 
 
(0.027) (0.257) 
         Panel B. Average Tobin’s Q for Subsequent Year 
One Year Fraction of female directors_TW 0.064 1.392 
 
1.023** 2.966 
 
-0.272 2.729 
 
 
(0.327) (1.999) 
 
(0.468) (2.447) 
 
(0.336) (2.623) 
            
Three Years Fraction of female directors_TW 0.168 2.387 
 
1.065** 4.565* 
 
-0.182 2.527 
 
 
(0.313) (2.144) 
 
(0.449) (2.549) 
 
(0.336) (2.818) 
            
Five Years Fraction of female directors_TW 0.154 2.988 
 
1.042** 4.947** 
 
-0.301 2.122 
    (0.297) (2.070)   (0.443) (2.428)   (0.307) (2.826) 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable definition  
 
Variables Descriptions Source 
Innovation Measures  
ln(1+R&D) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s R&D expenditures in a given year. Compustat 
ln(1+Patent) Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of patents filed by firm i (and 
eventually granted) in a given year. 
NBER Patent 
Database 
ln(1+Citation) Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received on firm 
i's patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. 
NBER Patent 
Database 
   
Female Board Representation Measures and Instruments  
Fraction of female directors_EW The number of female directors on the board divided by board size. IRRC 
Fraction of female directors_TW The sum of tenures of female directors divided by the sum of tenures of all directors 
on a board.  
IRRC 
Fraction of female indep. directors The number of female independent directors divided by the total number of 
independent directors on the board. 
IRRC 
Fraction of female exe. directors The number of female executive directors divided by the total number of executive 
directors on the board. 
IRRC 
Fraction of female post-CEO directors The number of post-CEO (i.e., joined after the current CEO) female directors divided 
by the total number of post-CEO directors on the board. 
IRRC 
Fraction of female pre-CEO directors The number of pre-CEO (i.e., joined before the current CEO) female directors divided 
by the total number of pre-CEO directors on the board. 
IRRC 
Fraction of female busy directors The number of female busy directors divided by the total number of busy directors on 
the board. A director is defined as busy if she holds three or more directorships, and 
non-busy otherwise. 
IRRC 
Fraction of female non-busy directors The number of female non-busy directors divided by the total number of non-busy 
directors on the board. 
IRRC 
Fraction of male directors linked to  
female directors 
The fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there are 
at least one female director, following Adams and Ferreira (2009). 
IRRC 
Female-to-male participation ratio A state-level variable calculated as the female labor force participation rate divided by 
the male labor force participation rate. The participation rate is defined as the labor 
force as a percentage of the civilian non-institutional population of each specified 
group. 
US Economic 
Census 
40 
 
Control variables  
Leverage The sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. Compustat 
R&D/TA R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Compustat 
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by 
total assets. Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the year-end closing 
price by the number of shares outstanding. 
Compustat 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Compustat 
PPE/TA Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Compustat 
ln(MVE) Natural logarithm of market capitalization where capitalization is defined as the 
product of stock price and number of shares outstanding. 
Compustat 
ln(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets in 2009 dollars. Compustat 
ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales in 2009 dollars. Compustat 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. IRRC 
Fraction of independent directors The number of independent directors divided by board size. IRRC 
Board MBA The fraction of directors with an MBA degree IRRC 
Board Ivy The fraction of directors who have attended an Ivy League university. IRRC 
Board qualification The fraction of directors with professional qualifications. IRRC 
Average director age The average age of all directors on the board. IRRC 
Average director tenure The average tenure of all directors on the board. IRRC 
No. of business segments The number of business segments. Compustat 
Antitakeover index The governance index introduced by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). It is based 
on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments. Each firm is given a score, from 0 to 6, based on the number of these 
provisions that the company has in the given year. 
Riskmetrics; 
Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell 
(2009) 
Four-Firm Concentration Ratio The fraction of a 5-digit NAICS industry's sales accounted for by its largest four 
firms. 
US Economic 
Consensus 
Eight-Firm Concentration Ratio The fraction of a 5-digit NAICS industry's sales accounted for by its largest eight 
firms. 
US Economic 
Consensus 
IP-Intensive Industry A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the 75 IP-intensive industries, and 0 
otherwise. The classification of the 75 IP intensive industries is provided by the US 
Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) and US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) in 2012. See ESA and USPTO (2012) for more details. 
ESA and 
USPTO (2012) 
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APPENDIX B 
Main results using the equally weighted fraction of female directors 
 
The table presents the OLS and IV regression results on the relation between female board representation and innovation 
productivity using the equally weighted fraction of female directors. The dependent variables include: ln(1+Patent) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually 
granted) in a given year. Independent variables include: Fraction of female directors_EW is the equally weighted measure 
of the fraction of female directors on the board. ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is 
market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-
term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA 
is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent directors is 
the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures 
divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable unless otherwise 
specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-
industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation)  
  OLS IV  OLS IV  
Independent Variables  1 2  3 4  
Intercept   -2.013*** -1.505***  -1.189*** -0.878***  
  (0.334) (0.402)  (0.198) (0.253)  
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.389* 5.565***  0.424* 4.238**  
  (0.224) (1.696)  (0.226) (1.761)  
ln(MVE)  0.341*** 0.265***  0.309*** 0.255***  
  (0.025) (0.036)  (0.025) (0.036)  
Tobin’s Q  -0.045** -0.010  -0.028 -0.003  
  (0.021) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.027)  
Leverage  0.118 0.040  0.097 0.031  
  (0.145) (0.157)  (0.151) (0.160)  
PPE/TA  -0.194 -0.134  -0.297* -0.213  
  (0.181) (0.198)  (0.173) (0.185)  
ROA  0.145 -0.161  0.422 0.167  
  (0.243) (0.285)  (0.280) (0.305)  
Fraction of independent directors  0.384*** -0.143  0.276** -0.112  
  (0.126) (0.207)  (0.138) (0.222)  
R&D/TA  4.291*** 4.315***  5.729*** 5.700***  
  (0.663) (0.741)  (0.747) (0.783)  
        
Industry effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
No. of obs.  6,644 6,644  6,644 6,644  
Adj. R2  0.502 0.388  0.457 0.408  
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APPENDIX C 
Diagnostic test results for the propensity score matching estimation 
 
The table reports the diagnostic test results for the propensity score matching estimates shown in Table 4. Panel A reports 
parameter estimates from the logit model used to estimate the propensity scores. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
the presence of female directors in a firm for a given year. Independent variables include: ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm 
of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total 
assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
assets. Fraction of independent directors is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on 
the board. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to 
the dependent variable unless otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity 
robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. Panel B reports the univariate comparisons of firm characteristics 
between firms with and without female directors and the corresponding t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Prematch Propensity Score Regression and Postmatch Diagnostic Regression  
  Dependent Variable:  
  Dummy equals 1 if female directors are on the board and 0 otherwise 
  Prematch  Postmatch 
Independent Variables  1  2 
Intercept   -6.448***  -0.127 
  (1.468)  (1.501) 
ln(MVE)  0.708***  -0.019 
  (0.052)  (0.061) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.368***  -0.004 
  (0.053)  (0.062) 
Leverage  0.340  0.028 
  (0.408)  (0.433) 
PPE/TA  -0.031  -0.209 
  (0.470)  (0.479) 
ROA  2.176**  0.097 
  (0.851)  (0.849) 
Fraction of independent directors  2.812***  -0.223 
  (0.368)  (0.392) 
R&D/TA  0.507  0.615 
  (1.747)  (1.831) 
     
Industry effects  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,619  2,940 
Pseudo R2  0.237  0.005 
Panel B. Differences in Firm Characteristics 
Variables 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
with Female Dirs. 
N=1,470 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
without Female Dirs. 
N=1,470 
 
Difference 
 
t-statistics 
ln(MVE)  7.093  7.112  -0.018  -0.398 
Tobin’s Q  1.993  2.005  -0.012  -0.235 
Leverage  0.214  0.211  0.003  0.425 
PPE/TA  0.304  0.308  -0.005  -0.561 
ROA  0.146  0.146  0.000  0.050 
Fraction of independent directors  0.638  0.640  -0.002  -0.293 
R&D/TA  0.032  0.032  0.000  0.058 
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APPENDIX D 
Main results with additional board-level controls for director characteristics 
 
This table re-examines OLS and IV regression results after controlling for additional director characteristics. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the additional 
director characteristics. Board MBA is the fraction of directors with an MBA degree. Board Ivy is the fraction of directors who have attended an Ivy League university. 
Board qualification is the fraction of directors with professional qualifications. Average director age is the average age of all directors on the board. Average director 
tenure is the average tenure of all directors on the board. t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences between the means (medians) for 
firms with at least one female director on the board and firms without female directors. Panel B shows the OLS and IV regression results with additional board-level 
controls for director characteristics. The instrumental variable used is Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, defined as the fraction of male directors on the 
board who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female director. Dependent variables include: ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total 
number of patents (Patent) filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations 
(Citation) received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. The variable of interest is Fraction of female directors_TW, defined as the tenure-
weighted measure of the fraction of female directors on the board. All other control variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry effects are constructed based on the 
Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics for director characteristics 
 
 
Whole Sample 
 
Firm-Year Obs. with 
Female Directors  
Firm-Year Obs. without 
Female Directors 
Variables  N Mean Median Stdev 
 
N Mean Median Stdev 
 
N Mean Median Stdev 
Board MBA  4,034 0.202 0.188 0.132 
 
2,728 0.219 0.214 0.132 
 
1,306 0.165*** 0.154*** 0.124 
Board Ivy  4,034 0.129 0.111 0.110 
 
2,728 0.144 0.133 0.108 
 
1,306 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.105 
Board qualification  4,034 0.016 0.000 0.037 
 
2,728 0.016 0.000 0.035 
 
1,306 0.016 0.000 0.041 
Average director age  6,644 59.149 59.429 3.810 
 
4,260 59.180 59.429 3.315 
 
2,384 59.092 59.429 4.563 
Average director tenure  6,105 9.753 9.214 3.911 
 
3,885 9.398 9.091 3.430 
 
2,220 10.373*** 9.667*** 4.570 
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Panel B: OLS and IV regression results with additional controls for director characteristics 
 
ln(1+Patent) 
 
ln(1+Citations) 
 
OLS IV 
 
OLS IV 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept -1.954*** -3.426*** 
 
-0.012 -2.778*** 
 
(0.482) (0.517) 
 
(0.434) (0.472) 
Fraction of female directors_TW 0.515* 4.655*** 
 
0.490** 2.708* 
 
(0.267) (1.755) 
 
(0.225) (1.612) 
ln(MVE) 0.312*** 0.253*** 
 
0.231*** 0.202*** 
 
(0.028) (0.037) 
 
(0.023) (0.034) 
Tobin’s Q -0.029 -0.002 
 
0.007 0.024 
 
(0.024) (0.028) 
 
(0.025) (0.027) 
Leverage 0.100 0.038 
 
-0.007 -0.079 
 
(0.166) (0.176) 
 
(0.155) (0.159) 
PPE/TA -0.179 -0.154 
 
-0.117 0.008 
 
(0.207) (0.223) 
 
(0.168) (0.178) 
ROA -0.272 -0.393 
 
-0.398 -0.554* 
 
(0.295) (0.334) 
 
(0.299) (0.308) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.313** -0.171 
 
0.136 -0.137 
 
(0.145) (0.243) 
 
(0.138) (0.229) 
R&D/TA 3.456*** 3.356*** 
 
3.305*** 3.011*** 
 
(0.729) (0.844) 
 
(0.694) (0.734) 
Board MBA 0.129 -0.007 
 
-0.017 -0.114 
 
(0.170) (0.190) 
 
(0.153) (0.158) 
Board Ivy 0.085 -0.213 
 
0.139 -0.068 
 
(0.217) (0.267) 
 
(0.197) (0.230) 
Board qualification 0.293 0.043 
 
0.321 0.251 
 
(0.547) (0.604) 
 
(0.466) (0.501) 
Average director age 0.010 0.016** 
 
0.011* 0.011* 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
Average director tenure 0.006 0.011 
 
0.004 0.009 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
     
Industry effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,034 4,034 
 
4,034 4,034 
Adj. R2 0.504 0.423 
 
0.445 0.423 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 3.3: Robustness tests of the baseline results 
 
The table examines the robustness of our findings on the relation between female board representation and 
corporate innovation to alternative econometric specifications and the use of different subsamples. The 
dependent variables are: ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed 
(and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. The main 
independent variables of interest are the equally weighted and tenure-weighted measures of the fraction of 
female directors. For brevity, we report only the coefficient estimates on the key variables of interest. Other 
controls are included as in the baseline models in Table 3 (we control for R&D expenditures in all regressions). 
All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-
industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
 
Tobit Regressions 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.524  0.967 
  (0.520)  (0.754) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   1.076**  1.660** 
  (0.545)  (0.709) 
   
Poisson Regressions 
Fraction of female directors_EW  -1.178  -1.791 
  (1.014)  (1.115) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   1.164*  1.138* 
  (0.654)  (0.662) 
   
Fama and MacBeth Regressions 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.453*  0.427 
  (0.199)  (0.242) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   0.592*  0.534 
  (0.286)  (0.305) 
   
Sample Period Ends in 2003 (N=4,260) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.601**  0.630* 
  (0.299)  (0.333) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   0.979***  0.999*** 
  (0.302)  (0.318) 
   
Excluding Female CEOs (N=6,553) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.438*  0.476** 
  (0.234)  (0.241) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   0.645***  0.707*** 
  (0.238)  (0.222) 
   
Excluding the Utilities and Telecoms Industries (N=5,915) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.339  0.419* 
  (0.241)  (0.242) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   0.503*  0.549** 
  (0.260)  (0.240) 
 
Controlling for the fraction of foreign directors, age and tenure diversity 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.376*  0.372* 
  (0.220)  (0.216) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   0.573**  0.577*** 
  (0.233)  (0.214) 
     
4 
 
Excluding industries with below median average citations per patent (N=3,285) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.462  0.374 
  (0.393)  (0.429) 
Fraction of female directors_TW   1.029**  0.827* 
  (0.441)  (0.456) 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 3.3: Robustness tests with citations per patent 
 
The table presents OLS regression results in which the dependent variable is citations per patent. Independent 
variables include: Fraction of Female Directors_EW (Fraction of Female Directors_TW) is the equally 
weighted (tenure-weighted) measure of the fraction of female directors on the board. ln(MVE) is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of 
equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. 
PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent directors is the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures 
divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable unless 
otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on 
the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
  Dependent Variable: ln(1+Citation/Patent) 
Independent Variables  1  2  3  4 
Intercept  0.311***  0.150***  0.037  -0.093 
  (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.113)  (0.085) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  0.134*  0.136*     
  (0.080)  (0.077)     
Fraction of female directors_TW      0.149**  0.139** 
      (0.067)  (0.065) 
ln(MVE)  0.046***  0.052***  0.049***  0.054*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Tobin’s Q  0.013  -0.012  0.010  -0.011 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Leverage  -0.075  -0.001  -0.076  -0.024 
  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.060)  (0.056) 
PPE/TA  -0.167***  -0.093**  -0.061  -0.057 
  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.052) 
ROA  -0.041  0.243**  -0.049  0.207* 
  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.117)  (0.116) 
Fraction of independent directors  0.049  0.027  0.052  0.026 
  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.048) 
R&D/TA    2.225***    2.329*** 
    (0.280)    (0.288) 
         
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,644  6,644  6,644  6,644 
Adj. R2  0.382  0.403  0.386  0.406 
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FOOTNOTE 10 
Propensity score matching estimator with replacement 
 
The table presents the average treatment effect estimates from propensity score matching with replacement. The 
logit model used to estimate the propensity scores is the same as in Panel A of Table 4. ln(1+Patent) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. 
ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received on a firm’s 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
with Female Dirs. 
N=3,832 
 Firm-Year Obs. 
without Female Dirs. 
N=2,229 
 
Difference 
 
t-stat 
ln(1+Patent)  0.671  0.458  0.213***  4.04 
ln(1+Citation)  0.622  0.438  0.184***  2.92 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 4.2: Instrumental variable estimation with external board seats as an additional control 
 
This table presents the robustness test results with external board seats as an additional control in 2SLS regressions. 
Panel A presents the first-stage regression results in which the dependent variables are the equally weighted and tenure-
weighted fraction of female directors. The instrumental variable is Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, 
defined as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female 
director. The results for other controls are suppressed for brevity. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results. 
The dependent variables are: ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self 
citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. No. external board seats is the total 
number of external board seats by directors. All other control variables are the same as those in the baseline models. 
Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on 
the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. First-Stage Regressions 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
 Fraction of female 
directors_EW 
 Fraction of female 
directors_TW 
Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, z1  0.056***  0.059*** 
  (0.011)  (0.012) 
     
Other Control Variables  Yes  Yes 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,629  6,629 
CD Wald F-statistics  89.720***  93.740*** 
Adj. R2  0.273  0.285 
Panel B. Second-Stage Regressions 
  Dependent Variables 
  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation)  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables  1  2  3  4 
Intercept   -1.504***  -1.031***  -1.323***  -0.794** 
  (0.393)  (0.242)  (0.483)  (0.319) 
Fraction of female directors_EW  5.122**  4.185*     
  (2.183)  (2.248)     
Fraction of female directors_TW       4.894**  3.939* 
      (2.048)  (2.080) 
ln(MVE)  0.268***  0.255***  0.283***  0.267*** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.012  -0.003  -0.012  -0.003 
  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Leverage  0.027  0.002  0.010  -0.012 
  (0.154)  (0.159)  (0.154)  (0.160) 
PPE/TA  -0.127  -0.093  -0.102  -0.082 
  (0.197)  (0.182)  (0.194)  (0.181) 
ROA  -0.152  0.166  -0.127  0.191 
  (0.299)  (0.326)  (0.295)  (0.320) 
Fraction of independent directors  -0.119  -0.114  -0.056  -0.061 
  (0.225)  (0.238)  (0.203)  (0.214) 
R&D/TA  4.269***  5.854***  4.127***  5.714*** 
  (0.729)  (0.785)  (0.726)  (0.783) 
No. external board seats  0.002  0.002  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
         
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,629  6,629  6,629  6,629 
Adj. R2  0.408  0.407  0.421  0.417 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 4.2: IV regressions with additional controls for directors’ education 
 
This table shows the second stage IV regression results after controlling for directors’ education. The instrumental variable used is Fraction of male directors linked to female 
directors, defined as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there is at least one female director. Dependent variables include: 
ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents (Patent) filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations (Citation) received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. Independent variables 
include: Fraction of female directors_EW (Fraction of female directors_TW) is the equally weighted (tenure-weighted) measure of the fraction of female directors on the 
board. Board education is the average Education of directors on the board. Board MBA is the fraction of directors with an MBA degree. Board Ivy is the fraction of directors 
who have attended an Ivy League university (i.e., Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, 
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University). Board qualification is the fraction of directors with professional qualifications. No. external board seats is the total number 
of external board seats by directors. All other control variables are the same as those in the baseline models. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-
industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
ln(1+Patent) ln(1+Citation) ln(1+Patent) ln(1+Citation) ln(1+Patent) ln(1+Citation) ln(1+Patent) ln(1+Citation) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept -1.867*** -1.143** -2.208*** -1.267*** -1.973*** -1.215*** -2.279*** -1.308*** 
 
(0.705) (0.453) (0.458) (0.365) (0.623) (0.378) (0.427) (0.318) 
Fraction of female  
directors_EW 7.199* 6.535* 
  
6.534* 6.345* 
  
 
(4.241) (3.863) 
  
(3.892) (3.573) 
  Fraction of female  
directors_TW 
  
4.467** 4.168** 
  
4.159** 4.090** 
   
(2.185) (2.072) 
  
(2.104) (2.014) 
Board education -0.252 -0.213 -0.130 -0.111 
    
 
(0.210) (0.181) (0.130) (0.119) 
    Board MBA 
    
-0.332 -0.390 -0.137 -0.204 
     
(0.271) (0.255) (0.193) (0.189) 
Board Ivy 
    
-0.352 -0.319 -0.153 -0.131 
     
(0.371) (0.338) (0.269) (0.248) 
Board qualification 
   
-0.161 -0.015 0.111 0.181 
     
(0.724) (0.631) (0.602) (0.533) 
ln(MVE) 0.224*** 0.154*** 0.256*** 0.180*** 0.223*** 0.149*** 0.254*** 0.177*** 
 
(0.058) (0.049) (0.039) (0.035) (0.055) (0.049) (0.039) (0.035) 
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Tobin's Q 0.012 0.033 -0.001 0.023 0.012 0.035 -0.002 0.024 
 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) 
Leverage -0.029 -0.440* -0.014 -0.394** 0.006 -0.410** 0.002 -0.382** 
 
(0.198) (0.230) (0.178) (0.197) (0.186) (0.208) (0.172) (0.186) 
PPE/TA -0.119 -0.357** -0.122 -0.392*** -0.128 -0.374** -0.126 -0.399*** 
 
(0.238) (0.155) (0.222) (0.141) (0.234) (0.153) (0.221) (0.140) 
ROA -0.663 -0.486 -0.473 -0.347 -0.552 -0.399 -0.413 -0.298 
 
(0.442) (0.367) (0.350) (0.329) (0.387) (0.356) (0.332) (0.331) 
Fraction of independent 
directors -0.347 -0.577 -0.214 -0.463 -0.334 -0.593 -0.207 -0.471 
 
(0.407) (0.389) (0.293) (0.295) (0.379) (0.377) (0.281) (0.287) 
R&D/TA 3.705*** 4.457*** 3.393*** 4.116*** 3.259*** 4.106*** 3.169*** 3.943*** 
 
(0.989) (0.994) (0.843) (0.847) (0.923) (0.885) (0.834) (0.805) 
No. external board seats 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
         
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 
Adj. R2 0.291 0.230 0.426 0.349 0.328 0.241 0.437 0.352 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 5.3: Alternative female board representation measures 
independent vs. executive female directors 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results with alternative measures of female board representation. The 
dependent variables are ln(1+R&D), ln(1+Patent) and ln(1+Citation). Independent variables include: Fraction 
of female indep. directors (Fraction of female exe. directors) is calculated as the number of female independent 
(executive) directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. Fraction of male exe. directors is 
calculated as the number of male executive directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debts 
divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures 
divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable unless 
otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on 
the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  ln(1+R&D)  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables  1  2  3 
Intercept  -2.325**  -1.670***  -0.910*** 
  (0.978)  (0.332)  (0.194) 
Fraction of female indep. directors  1.330***  0.618**  0.621** 
  (0.455)  (0.241)  (0.247) 
Fraction of female exe. directors  -1.933  -0.879  -0.889* 
  (1.248)  (0.558)  (0.524) 
Fraction of male exe. directors  -0.698**  -0.466***  -0.345* 
  (0.309)  (0.171)  (0.191) 
ln(MVE)  0.575***  0.337***  0.306*** 
  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Tobin’s Q  0.002  -0.043**  -0.027 
  (0.035)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Leverage  -0.137  0.090  0.072 
  (0.271)  (0.144)  (0.151) 
PPE/TA  -1.287***  -0.209  -0.308* 
  (0.292)  (0.181)  (0.172) 
ROA  -1.473***  0.150  0.427 
  (0.488)  (0.245)  (0.282) 
R&D/TA    4.250***  5.678*** 
    (0.666)  (0.749) 
       
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,644  6,644  6,644 
Adj. R2  0.720  0.502  0.457 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 5.3: Alternative female board representation measures 
pre- vs. post-CEO female directors 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results with alternative measures of female board representation. The 
dependent variables are ln(1+R&D), ln(1+Patent) and ln(1+Citation). Independent variables include: Fraction 
of female pre-CEO directors (Fraction of female post-CEO directors) is calculated as the number of pre-CEO 
(post-CEO) female directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. Fraction of male post-CEO 
directors is calculated as the number of post-CEO male directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. ln(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total 
assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term 
debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent 
directors is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. R&D/TA 
is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the 
dependent variable unless otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects 
are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  ln(1+R&D)  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables  1  2  3 
Intercept  -1.077  -1.692***  -1.179*** 
  (0.795)  (0.196)  (0.187) 
Fraction of female post-CEO directors  0.188  0.143  0.336 
  (0.508)  (0.268)  (0.269) 
Fraction of female pre-CEO directors  0.903  0.739**  0.448* 
  (0.579)  (0.315)  (0.262) 
Fraction of male post-CEO directors  -0.040  -0.024  -0.017 
  (0.112)  (0.066)  (0.071) 
ln(MVE)  0.576***  0.329***  0.294*** 
  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
Tobin’s Q  0.013  -0.044**  -0.018 
  (0.035)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
Leverage  -0.048  0.165  0.057 
  (0.273)  (0.148)  (0.148) 
PPE/TA  -1.307***  -0.307*  -0.199 
  (0.295)  (0.178)  (0.163) 
ROA  -1.683***  0.032  0.020 
  (0.497)  (0.253)  (0.275) 
Fraction of independent directors  0.727***  0.410***  0.244* 
  (0.217)  (0.130)  (0.133) 
R&D/TA    4.537***  5.149*** 
    (0.667)  (0.715) 
       
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,060  6,060  6,060 
Adj. R2  0.779  0.473  0.434 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Section 5.3: Alternative female board representation measures 
busy vs. non-busy female directors 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results with alternative measures of female board representation. The 
dependent variables are ln(1+R&D), ln(1+Patent) and ln(1+Citation). Independent variables include: Fraction 
of female busy directors (Fraction of female non-busy directors) is calculated as the number of female busy 
(non-busy) directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. Fraction of male busy directors is 
calculated as the number of male busy directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. A director 
is defined as busy if he or she holds three or more directorships, and non-busy otherwise. ln(MVE) is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of 
equity, all divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. 
PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Fraction of independent directors is the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures 
divided by total assets. All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable unless 
otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on 
the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  ln(1+R&D)  ln(1+Patent)  ln(1+Citation) 
Independent Variables  1  2  3 
Intercept  -1.628***  -1.580***  -1.105*** 
  (0.336)  (0.212)  (0.208) 
Fraction of female busy directors  1.932  0.125  -0.000 
  (1.188)  (0.683)  (0.599) 
Fraction of female non-busy directors  0.804*  0.566**  0.495** 
  (0.463)  (0.226)  (0.231) 
Fraction of male busy directors  0.062  0.479  0.425 
  (0.345)  (0.305)  (0.312) 
ln(MVE)  0.567***  0.326***  0.299*** 
  (0.042)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Tobin’s Q  0.003  -0.044**  -0.025 
  (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Leverage  0.179  0.204  0.092 
  (0.285)  (0.147)  (0.151) 
PPE/TA  -1.943***  -0.410**  -0.291* 
  (0.317)  (0.179)  (0.173) 
ROA  -1.240**  0.327  0.468* 
  (0.510)  (0.252)  (0.281) 
Fraction of independent directors  0.919***  0.371***  0.233* 
  (0.221)  (0.128)  (0.139) 
R&D/TA    4.717***  5.734*** 
    (0.671)  (0.746) 
       
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  6,644  6,644  6,644 
Adj. R2  0.686  0.490  0.458 
 
 
 
